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Abstract 
Modern information and communication technologies (ICT) provide numerous opportunities to support 
e-learning in higher education. Recent devlopments such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) 
utilize the scalabiltiy and interactivity of the ICT to broaden the accessibility of university education. 
However, the potential of ICT in enhancing students’ learning experience and success is far from being 
fully utilized. One potential area for the development of new e-learning mechanisms is at the intersection 
of collective intellegence and crowdsourcing mechanisms: The knowledge-disseminating ability of a 
collective intelligence platform combined with the interactivity and participative nature of 
crowdsourcing knowledge from fellow students may enhance motiviation and acceptance of students’ 
learning. Following a crowd-based approach we present a prototype that offers a highly collaborative 
and competitive learning environment to improve the mutual exchange of knowledge as well as to 
encourage the development of a knowledge community. Our approach draws upon the principle of 
virtual stock markets (also “prediction markets”), a well-known collective intelligence mechanism 
which we enhanced with crowdsourcing elements. We describe the proposed system architecture, 
evaluate the practical feasibility of our prototype in the field and provide implications for future 
research. 
Keywords: Knowledge Sharing, Knowledge Communities, Virtual Stock Markets, Prediction Markets, 
Collaboration, Competitive Environments, Crowdsourcing, Collective Intelligence, E-Learning, Higher 
Education 
1 Introduction 
Collective intelligence (or “Wisdom of Crowds”; Surowiecki 2004) and crowdsourcing are two related 
concepts which aim at utilizing knowledge, tasks and ideas of users connected through information and 
communication technology. Numerous applications emerged from this concept, for example: forecast-
ing the future (e.g., prediction markets), designing new products (e.g., Jovoto), funding of initiatives 
(e.g., Kickstarter), diverse crowdsourcing tasks (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk) or several public co-
creation tasks, such as the mapping of crime (e.g., www.hatari.co.ke). Another very challenging field 
for any form of collaborative intelligence and crowdsourcing is the field of knowledge sharing and e-
learning such as students’ interest to exchange knowledge in order to prepare for exams. 
The key challenges for crowd-based approaches, not only in e-learning, are to effectively build up a 
community and motivate a large group of people to pursue certain co-creation tasks (Leimeister et al. 
2009; Zheng et al. 2011). In particular, the motivation to share knowledge is a challenge which has 
received considerable interest in previous literature (Ardichvili et al. 2003; Cho et al. 2010; Lin 2007; 
Nov 2007; Wasko/Faraj 2005). Within the context of crowdsourcing, tournament-based (i.e., competi-
tive) or collaboration-based mechanisms have been proposed to motivate the crowd (e.g., Afuah/Tucci 
2012; Leimeister 2012). However, in case of e-learning, additional aspects such as the motivation of 
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students to learn need to be considered (Qin et al. 1995). Recently, several studies in the field of e-
learning and knowledge management strongly endorse the development of “co-opetitive” environments, 
which combine competitive and collaborative approaches (Fu et al. 2009; Ghobadi/D'Ambra 2012; Tsai 
2002). 
Based on these concepts, this study proposes a new crowd-based and co-opetitive knowledge sharing 
mechanism for the higher education sector that is able to effectively motivate students in their efforts to 
learn and share knowledge. Our goal is to present a prototype that is able to make use of the wisdom of 
the crowd by applying the principle of virtual stock markets (VSM), a collective intelligence mechanism 
that is commonly used to predict future events enhanced by crowdsourcing elements. We want to pro-
vide a proof-of-concept that VSMs can be established as a motivation mechanism to encourage students 
to exchange knowledge as well. A major design objective is to offer a co-opetitive solution that allows 
the pooling of competitive as well as collaborative elements within one knowledge sharing mechanism. 
In order to empirically evaluate our proposed mechanism within the area of higher education, we picked 
a medium-sized lecture (on the fundamentals of electronic commerce (ECOM)) and implemented the so 
called ECOM prototype. The results of the evaluation and the ECOM platform itself will be presented 
in a live demonstration at the ECIS 2014. All hardware and software needed to present the prototype 
will be provided by the authors themselves. 
2 Background and Related Literature 
2.1 E-learning and a student’s motivation to learn and share knowledge 
Modern ICT offers a wide range of e-learning tools for the higher education sector. Forums, authoring 
systems, virtual classrooms, wikis, micro blogging, or online self-tests represent a variety of categories 
from which students can pick numerous solutions to fill their needs (Brockbank 2003; Williams 2003; 
Steiner et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the mere provision of sophisticated ICT cannot guarantee the student`s 
learning success alone. Instead, numerous studies single out the gap between technology potential on 
the one hand and the motivation to learn and share knowledge by making use of these e-learning 
technologies on the other hand (e.g. Keengwe et al. 2008; Liu et al. 2009; Park 2009; Steiner et al. 2013). 
Although one might assume that there is already a strong motivation for students to learn, many students 
are familiar with a very common phenomenon, called “academic procrastination” – the act of needlessly 
delaying academic duties and responsibilities (Deniz et al. 2009; Haycock et al. 1998). According to a 
study conducted by Orellana-Damacela et al. (2000) and consistent with previous findings in college 
student samples (Hill et al. 1978; Solomon/Rothblum 1984) around 50% of students reported moderate 
to high levels of procrastinating behavior. While numerous studies investigated the causes, effects and 
interrelations of procrastination (e.g. Haycock et al. 1998, Hess et al. 2000; Klassen et al. 2008; Steel 
2007), little is known about effective mechanisms to counter the phenomenon. 
Beneath a student’s motivation to learn, every e-learning system that relies on the principle of collabo-
ratively created content also requires a student’s motivation to share his private knowledge. Looking at 
public internet services, such as content sharing networks, open content production, newsgroups, fo-
rums, or virtual communities, we find many people participating in different kinds of knowledge-ex-
change practices (Zhang/Zhu 2011). Despite the threat of free-riding behaviour and the absence of any 
monetary sources of motivation, people seem to be willing to share their private knowledge with 
strangers they never physically met before (Wasko/Faraj 2005). While this may hold true for large public 
sites on the internet, numerous closed communities seem to face insurmountable difficulties when filling 
their non-public knowledge repositories with collaboratively created content (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). 
This is not surprising, as knowledge is intangible and guarding this knowledge to obtain a competitive 
advantage is an obvious strategy in a competitive environment (Gupta/Govindarajan 2000; No-
naka/Konno 1998; Ipe 2003). Furthermore, intrinsic benefits to share knowledge, such as self-efficacy 
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and the enjoyment to help others are hard to be generated artificially in a competitive environment. 
Beyond that, recent studies in the context of e-learning and knowledge sharing push for “co-opetitive” 
environments that integrate competitive as well as collaborative elements to achieve a higher overall 
knowledge level (Fu et al. 2009; Tsai 2002). They argue that students in competitive learning environ-
ments develop higher analytical skills, while those in collaborative learning environments show higher 
synthetic skills (Fu et al. 2009). 
2.2 Crowdsourcing: competition vs. collaboration 
The artificial word “crowdsourcing”, derived from the full term “crowd-based outsourcing”, was ini-
tially coined by Jeff Howe in an article of Wired Magazine (2006). Since then, crowdsourcing mecha-
nisms gained much attention in research, especially in the context of open innovation (Enkel et al. 2009; 
Leimeister et al. 2009), where we also find a growing need to establish coopetitive environments (Cas-
siman et al. 2009). The basic idea behind any crowdsourcing initiative is to assemble a large group of 
people and make use of the Wisdom of Crowds to perform different company-related tasks (Leimeister 
2010). This allows organizations to find solutions and to co-create contents for a variety of challenges 
by involving as valuable groups as pioneers, fans, lead-users, gifted tinkerers or other creative minds 
inside and outside the organizations’ boundaries. 
Previous literature distinguishes between tournament-based (i.e. competitive) and collaboration-based 
crowdsourcing mechanisms (Afuah/Tucci 2012; Leimeister 2012). By using a tournament-based 
crowdsourcing mechanism, members of the crowd self-select to find their own solution for a given 
problem (Afuah/Tucci 2012). This provides the initiator with many options. The incentive design is of 
critical importance here. In order to motivate a great number of users, the tournament mechanism should 
not deter new entrants to join the competition at a later point in time (Terwiesch/Xu 2008). However, 
an extrinsic motivation to gain money may have no effect on the intention to participate or the quality 
of results (Chen et al. 2010; Zheng et al. 2011). Instead, the possibility to gain reputation and in particular 
the users’ intrinsic motivation are playing a more important role to generate a highly motivated crowd. 
In contrast to tournament-based mechanisms, the self-selected members of the crowd in a collaboration-
based crowdsourcing approach offer just one single solution (Afuah/Tucci 2012). An inherent charac-
teristic is that all members of the crowd work on one overarching objective on the basis of teamwork. 
One further characteristic is the breakdown of a super-ordinate task into many subsidiary tasks. There-
fore, finding the right level of task detail is a key element in the design of collaboration-based 
crowdsourcing projects. In order to find a solution the operating agency needs to control the direction 
that the crowd has to go, as well as to find the appropriate mechanism for information aggregation. 
2.3 Virtual stock markets – a coopetitive crowdsourcing mechanism? 
Virtual Stock Markets (VSMs) are digital securities exchanges with the overarching purpose to gather 
and aggregate shared information and expectations of a crowd of people. Their scope of application is 
the prediction of future real and fictitious events, such as election results (Berg et al. 2008; Snowberg et 
al. 2007), sales forecasts (Spann/Skiera 2003; Ostrover 2005), and risk prognosis (Wolfers/Zitzewitz 
2004). Further areas of application are the identification of experts (Spann et al. 2009), the comparison 
of decision alternatives (Berg/Rietz 2003), the generation and evaluation of ideas (Soukhoroukova et al. 
2012) or new product concept testing (Dahan et al. 2010). The corresponding terms “prediction market”, 
“decision market”, “idea future”, or “preference market” are indicators for their manifold areas of ap-
plication and the particular focus of their market design. In contrast to financial stock exchanges a 
VSM’s mechanism – generally implemented as a web platform – does not depend on the usage of sig-
nificant amounts of money (Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004). Instead, trading is often based on non-signif-
icant amounts of money or virtual play money (Soukhoroukova/Spann 2006). 
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The theoretical underpinnings of VSMs are the Hayek hypothesis and Fama’s efficient market hypoth-
esis (Spann/Skiera 2003). According to Fama, asset prices in an efficient [capital] market fully reflect 
all value-related information available to participants and by that aggregate all expectations on the like-
lihood of future pay-outs (Fama 1970; Fama 1991). In addition, Hayek provides the explanation why 
markets – due to their competition-based design – may be seen as the most efficient mechanism to 
aggregate asymmetrically dispersed information (Hayek 1945; Smith 1982). Applied to VSMs, the gen-
eral idea is to link the pay-out of a contract (i.e. “virtual stock”) to a future event. For such an event we 
can imagine the outcome of a political election, sales figures or the results of a sports event. This way, 
each virtual stock represents a bet on a future market state (Spann/Skiera 2003). Participants of the VSM 
are then invited to adjust their virtual stock portfolios by using their virtual play money to buy or sell 
shares of these virtual stocks. Thereby the trading price of a virtual stock reflects the crowd’s expectation 
about the occurrence of the pay-out event at any time. 
3 Knowledge Stock Exchanges: Design of the ECOM Prototype 
We propose a prototype that is designed to motivate students to overcome procrastination tendencies 
and to proactively engage in a knowledge sharing process at an early stage of their exam preparation. 
Our goal is to fill a knowledge repository with different types of knowledge contents. These contents, 
hereinafter called “knowledge objects”, can be for example student transcripts, literature overviews, 
numerical examples, brief explanations or terminology dictionaries. Generally, such a repository can 
store any type of knowledge object that might be helpful for students to prepare for their exam. 
 
Figure 1. General principle of a knowledge stock exchange 
The basic idea of the proposed mechanism is to couple the value of explicit knowledge with the price of 
a virtual stock (see Figure 1). Therefore each knowledge object is represented by a so called “virtual 
knowledge stock” that can be traded on a VSM. To derive the value for a knowledge object, every stock 
encloses a pay-out promise related to a knowledge challenge. Each of these challenges compares a group 
of knowledge objects based on some predetermined criteria. These criteria – which can be freely chosen 
by a market supervisor – may comprise a knowledge object’s level of detail, its relevance and suitability 
to a problem or its coverage of a particular topic. Depending on a knowledge object’s chance to win the 
challenge, all market participants can place bets on the stock’s final pay-out by buying or selling shares 
of the corresponding stock. Similar to classical VSMs, the resulting price provides a reliable prognosis 
for a stock’s future pay-out and by that indicates the knowledge object’s overall quality. 
Since all participants are incentivised to invest in the most promising stocks to maximize the value of 
their virtual stock portfolios, the mechanism’s competitive character is obvious. We suggest a 10%-
Edit-Rule which states that the contents of a stock – texts as well as attached images or documents – can 
be edited as long as a market participant holds at least 10% of the particular stock’s share. This rule is 
supposed to encourage a trader to also buy shares of stocks he considers to be of low quality. With a 
share of 10% he can now start to improve the quality by uploading additional images and documents or 
Heusler/Spann / Knowledge Stock Exchanges 
 
 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                         5 
 
 
by editing the textual description of the stock. Since the price is supposed to always reflect the stock’s 
probability to receive a pay-out and by that represents its quality, the trader can now sell his shares at a 
higher price (as long as the quality of all other stocks in the market has not been improved as well). This 
allows us to use a VSM as a competitive as well as collaborative incentive mechanism that is directed 
to build up a knowledge repository. Depending on an effective knowledge challenge design, we are able 
to guide the knowledge creation and sharing process into any desired direction. 
In order to explain the prototype for practitioners and a technology-oriented audience in more detail, we 
now focus on the overall course of competition and the dynamic processes within the system (see 3.1). 
This includes the description of process stages as well as their logical and temporal dependencies. The 
subsequent chapter 3.2 explains the systems structure with its most essential subsystems and elements 
including all functionalities needed to ensure a smooth operation of the whole system. 
3.1 The course of competition – a dynamic perspective 
The course of competition is mainly determined by its embedded knowledge challenges. Although the 
challenges run independently from one another, they all follow the same lifecycle (see Figure 2): (1) 
proposal stage, (2) offering stage, (3) trading stage and (4) pay-out stage. This implies that some chal-
lenges might start earlier than others and allows to synchronize the e-learning platform with the pro-
gression of a lecture. 
 
Figure 2. Knowledge challenge lifecycle 
3.1.1 Proposal stage 
First, the system is initialized with several knowledge challenges by a so called market supervisor. By 
creating a knowledge challenge, the market supervisor simultaneously creates a VSM. So from a tech-
nical perspective, both concepts, “knowledge challenge” and “virtual stock market”, are interchangea-
ble. Moreover, it is advisable for a market supervisor to prepare at least one sample proposal for each 
challenge to give the participants a hint of how a knowledge object may look like. 
After their registration, students are expected to propose knowledge objects for each of the challenges. 
In doing so, students can earn so called “contribution points” – the essential currency to win the contri-
bution ranking (Appendix – Figure 3). To gain additional points, students are invited to suggest further 
improvements or extensions for existing knowledge objects as well as to rate and comment on discus-
sions that were started by others. Finally, the market supervisor approves all serious knowledge stocks. 
3.1.2 Offering stage 
Approved stocks are now initially offered to all participants by using a sealed bid auction (also “initial 
public offering” resp. “IPO”). For the ECOM prototype, we use a single-day fixed price auction mech-
anism that derives the starting price from the number of ordered shares. Alternative IPO methods are 
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the discriminatory or the uniform price auction (Bower/Bunn 2001). Nevertheless, a major advantage 
for the fixed price auction mechanism is its high level of transparency and easy communicability to the 
participants. To represent the opposing side of such an IPO auction, we introduce an automated bank 
role that can handle the auction revenues as well as the final pay-outs. 
IPO auctions offer the students (in a trader role) the opportunity to compose their initial portfolios ac-
cording to their personal preferences and their individual appreciation of the stocks. Since all bids are 
submitted in a concealed manner, traders remain uninfluenced in their preferences by other traders un-
less the auctions end. As soon as an IPO auction is cleared, the aggregated demand of shares will be 
revealed, indicating a first evaluation of the stocks for the corresponding knowledge challenge. 
3.1.3 Trading stage 
As soon as the trading stage starts, all stocks are listed on a virtual stock exchange, ready for trading. In 
case of the ECOM prototype, all traders receive an initial endowment of Virt$ 1,000 to buy and sell 
shares of each listed stock. All orders along with their associated money and securities transactions are 
executed immediately. This can be achieved due to the use of an automated market maker algorithm that 
provides permanent liquidity within the market (see 3.2.3). Right from the start of the trading stage, all 
participants are encouraged to increase their financial assets (in Virt$). The performance ranking offers 
a permanent comparison of all traders’ financial situation by publishing the aggregated value of their 
liquid funds together with their current portfolio value. While this allows users to compare with each 
other, it also underlines the mechanism’s competitive character. 
Although the final pay-outs only take place in the following pay-out stage, users can already realize 
significant arbitrage profits through the continuous trading of stocks. In particular, the 10%-Edit-Rule 
offers traders the possibility to edit a stock’s content or upload complementary images and other files. 
This allows traders to influence the value of a stock and thereby make use of arbitrage effects. It is also 
a key differentiator compared to conventional VSMs such as prediction markets or preference markets 
that offer stocks with fixed contractual specifications. 
3.1.4 Pay-out stage 
In this stage, a group of judges evaluates the contents of the virtual knowledge stocks with regard to the 
related challenge and vote to find a winning stock for each challenge. Subsequently, the final pay-outs 
of Virt$ 1.00 per share can be executed by the automated bank. As soon as all pay-outs were distributed 
to the shareholders of the winning stocks, these stocks can be liquidated. Finally, participants can receive 
prizes according to their position in the performance and contribution ranking. 
3.2 Subsystem and functionalities – a structural perspective 
The whole prototype consists of four major subsystems: (1) the knowledge challenge subsystem, (2) the 
knowledge repository subsystem, (3) the virtual stock exchange subsystem, and (4) the social interaction 
subsystem. Their essential objects and functionalities are described in the following. 
3.2.1 Knowledge challenge subsystem 
The knowledge challenge subsystem contains all user accounts and offers basic functionalities such as 
the user registration, the account management and the system’s role management (Appendix – Figure 
4). Since each trader possesses a bank account to store his money and a securities account to deposit his 
securities positions (Appendix – Figure 5), the subsystem also needs to provide some elementary 
mechanisms to carry out money and securities transactions between those accounts. 
The subsystem’s primary functionality – solely for market supervisors – is to create and manage 
knowledge challenges (Appendix – Figure 6 and Figure 7). This includes the ability to set a challenge’s 
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lifecycle or to trigger certain events, such as the final payouts. Apart from a short task description, each 
knowledge challenge requires the fulfilment of several criteria – e.g., a reasonable level of detail, 
understandability, high quality and relevance – as conditions for the final payout. Other key elements of 
the subsystem are the two independent rankings – the performance ranking and the contribution ranking. 
While the performance ranking lists each user account according to its aggregated value of financial 
assets, the contribution ranking gives an overview of all contribution points gathered so far. 
3.2.2 Knowledge repository subsystem 
The knowledge repository subsystem can be any sort of content management system (CMS) that offers 
the basic functionalities to create, store, edit and publish diverse types of knowledge content. In addition, 
the knowledge repository is supposed to provide co-authoring functionalities which we can find in wikis 
or some other sort of collaborative CMS (e.g., Ebersbach/Glaser 2005). 
For reasons of simplicity, the ECOM prototype uses a knowledge repository that is reduced to the most 
basic capabilities of such a collaborative CMS. It allows users to create and edit a textual description for 
their solution on a given knowledge challenge. These textual solutions are called “knowledge objects”, 
each of them representing a virtual knowledge stock. To complement a textual description by 
illustrations and additional documents, the ECOM platform allows users to upload additional file types. 
3.2.3 Virtual stock exchange subsystem 
The virtual stock exchange hosts several markets, each representing a knowledge challenge. Each of the 
markets contains several stocks (Appendix – Figure 8). Both objects – markets and stocks – require 
scheduling and workflow management functionalities to traverse the respective object’s lifecycle. 
This subsystem needs a continuous trading mechanism to match demand and supply during trading 
stage. An important requirement for such a mechanism is its ability to work in an environment with very 
few traders and a large range of stocks. For this reason, we strongly advise to use an automated market 
maker mechanism (e.g. Slamka et al. 2013). While a market maker algorithm is primarily used to ensure 
permanent liquidity, its reaction time and adaptability to the crowd’s collective intelligence should not 
be neglected (see Brahma et al. 2012). The market maker used for the ECOM prototype is based on 
Hanson’s logarithmic market scoring rules (see Hanson 2003; Othman et al. 2010). Depending on the 
number of shares circulating in the market, the market maker calculates the reference price for each 
stock. This reference price indicates the current price for a minimum amount of shares and 
simultaneously signals the market’s aggregated information about a stock’s probability to receive a pay-
out. The more shares a trader ordert, the higher the price increase. Traders can easily interpret the price 
of each stock as its probability to win the corresponding challenge. 
3.2.4 Social interaction subsystem 
A crucial part to support coordination and communication between all users is the integration of a social 
interaction subsystem. Some exemplary technologies that can be used to encourage collaboration among 
users are discussion boards or private messaging. In order to prevent participants from collusion, the 
usage of real-time communication should be treated with caution. At least a fraud detection mechanism 
for certain trading and communication patterns in combination with a deeper understanding of the 
arising social networks is advisable. The ECOM prototype offers a simple forum functionality that 
allows users to start discussions either on the knowledge challenges or on the proposed knowledge 
objects. Discussions can be used to provide feedback for a knowledge object. Besides the possibility to 
post comments, users can also rate contributions of others by using a simple thumbs-up /-down 
functionality. This helps the owners of knowledge objects whether to integrate a suggestion or not. 
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3.3 Key results of the prototype application 
In order to evaluate the ECOM prototype, we picked the medium-sized lecture “Electronic Commerce” 
with around 100 students regularly visiting the lecture and a related exercise course. As the only exog-
enous incentives we raffled three university-branded coffee mugs worth € 7.00 for the mere participation 
and offered two university-branded main prizes worth € 25.00 for the winner of each ranking. Students 
participated voluntarily and did not receive any form of grade improvement or other bonuses. This shall 
not preclude the possibility for students to profit from information of other students that were exchanged 
over the platform. The platform stated five weeks before the final exam. In sum, 28 participants (54% 
female; 46 % male) created 91 logins; each of these students visited the platform 3.25 times on average. 
The platform offered six knowledge challenges (and two sample stocks) and participants proposed a 
total of 15 virtual knowledge objects and related stocks. We observed that these 17 knowledge objects 
were edited by up to five different users (with 2.8 different editors per object on average). These were 
accompanied by 12 vivid discussions that were started by users along with 77 forum visits, 32 posts and 
42 forum ratings. These numbers underline the prototype’s collaborative potential. Based on exploratory 
findings, we suppose that requests for simple as well as iterative tasks are more likely to meet the users’ 
intention to contribute. These observations support the importance of a modular problem structuring in 
accordance with other researchers (Afuah/Tucci 2012, 363; Baldwin/Clark 2006). 
We also find evidence for the prototype’s competitive nature. During offering and trading stage, 21.4 % 
of all participants submitted 93 orders in total. These orders can be separated into 29 IPO bids during 
offering stage, and 40 buy- as well as 24 sell-orders during trading stage. With an overall share of 30 % 
of all ordering activities and due to its limitation to only one day, the offering stage received an above-
average attention of the active participants compared to other stages. The 29 IPO bids were almost 
equally distributed over each of the 17 IPO auctions, which indicates that the usage of a single-day fixed 
price auction mechanism to obtain an uninfluenced first guess on the value of the virtual knowledge 
stocks succeeded very well. If we take a look at the trading activities over time, we see a continuous 
number of orders over the whole trading stage. The students’ interest on the continuous improvement of 
knowledge objects over the whole project duration is promising for future studies in this area. 
4 Conclusion 
The study’s primary contribution is the proposal of a crowd-based and co-opetitive knowledge sharing 
mechanism in higher education. We offer a detailed description of the prototype’s architecture to 
facilitate its implementation and reproduction for practitioners and researchers. Based on a medium-
sized lecture we made the first step to evaluate the proposed system architecture. The experimental 
implementation demonstrates that the general principle of a VSM can be applied as an incentive 
mechanism that invites students to share their private knowledge with others. This permits lecturers to 
take a step back and allows students to build up a knowledge base largely on their own. Based on our 
prototype’s positive evaluation which was however limited by a rather small sample size, we already 
plan to introduce the mechanism to a massively open online course (MOOC). Given the high drop-out 
rates of these courses (Adamopoulos 2013), we see great potential here to further evaluate our prototype 
and improve the students’ motivation to learn and share knowledge.  
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Appendix – Additional Screen Shots 
 
Figure 3. Screen Shot: Contribution Ranking 
 
Figure 4. Screen Shot: User Profile 
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Figure 5. Screen Shot: Securities Account 
 
Figure 6. Screen Shot: Challenges Overview 
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Figure 7. Screen Shot: Knowledge Challenge 
 
Figure 8. Screen Shot: Virtual Stocks 
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